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11.  The effects of targets and indicators 
on policy formulation: narrowing 
down, crowding out and locking in
Christina Boswell, Steve Yearley,  
Colin Fleming, Eugénia Rodrigues and  
Graham Spinardi
INTRODUCTION
Targets have become an increasingly important component of governance 
and public sector management in the last two decades, especially across 
OECD countries. Such targets often involve the use of performance indi-
cators, a policy tool introduced to measure and vouchsafe how far specific 
targets have been met. Indeed, the possibility of reliably measuring the 
achievement of targets through performance indicators (PIs) is gener-
ally a precondition for the selection of targets (Bevan and Hood 2006; 
Audit Commission 2000a). The two policy instruments are thus closely 
interconnected.
The received wisdom among policymakers is that PIs and targets are 
management tools, adopted to improve the quality and value- for- money 
of public services. By introducing clear and transparent targets, and 
subjecting these to regular monitoring through measuring them against 
PIs, governments incentivize improvements in the performance of those 
involved in service delivery, and increase public accountability (HM 
Treasury 1998; Audit Commission 2000a; 2000b). Ostensibly, then, targets 
and related PIs might be best characterized as instruments for ensuring 
the effective delivery, or implementation, of policies and programmes that 
have already been adopted.
However, we argue in this chapter that targets and PIs can also have an 
important role in policy formulation. They serve to shape and delimit the 
range of options open to policymakers. As scholars of public administra-
tion have noted, targets and PIs can have a number of unintended effects, 
encouraging forms of gaming or creating perverse incentive  structures 
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(Smith 1990; 1995; James 2004; Pidd 2005; Bevan and Hood 2006). 
Building on these contributions, we identify three main ways in which 
targets and PIs might potentially constrain policy formulation. First, in 
order to be deployable as targets, policy goals need to meet a number of 
managerial, political and technical criteria. This implies that only a subset 
of policy objectives may end up being codified as targets, narrowing down 
the range of policy options or objectives that receive the target treatment. 
This ‘narrowing down’ effect may be exacerbated by a second effect, 
which we call the ‘crowding out’ effect. Once adopted, targets can become 
the (sometimes exclusive) focus of political discussion and organizational 
action. This can ‘crowd out’ other objectives and considerations in policy 
formulation processes, with the target in some cases even supplanting the 
original underlying objective. What was initially a means becomes an end 
in itself. Third, targets and PIs may also have a ‘locking in’ effect over 
time. Once adopted, they can commit governments – and their critics – to 
overly specified courses of action, which are not responsive to changing 
conditions. Taken together, these three effects imply that the introduction 
of targets and PIs can have a significant effect on policy formulation, and 
not always in ways intended by those originally introducing them.
This chapter explores how far these three constraining effects have influ-
enced policy formulation in the case of targets and PIs developed as part 
of the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) rolled out by the UK government 
between 2000 and 2010. We compare three different policy areas: immi-
gration control, climate change and defence procurement. These cases 
offer scope for comparing policy areas with quite distinct ‘audiences’. 
Immigration is a highly politicized area, which is the object of ongoing 
media and political attention, and there is strong pressure on incumbents 
to demonstrate their capacity to manage the problem. Climate change is 
a more technocratic area, relatively protected from popular media and 
political attention, but subject to more specialized scrutiny from NGOs 
and bound by international treaty obligations. Defence procurement 
remains largely sequestered from popular, political or media attention, 
despite continued problems of overspend and poor  performance – its 
main form of scrutiny is through parliamentary committees, the National 
Audit Office (NAO), and the controller of its purse strings, the Treasury. 
We expect these variations in audience to produce different types of pres-
sures in selecting targets and PIs, in turn generating different patterns of 
constraint in policy formulation.
The chapter starts by setting out the main features of the PSAs intro-
duced by the post- 1997 Labour administration. It suggests the ways in 
which PSA targets and PIs may have had a constraining effect on policy 
formulation through processes of narrowing down, crowding out and 
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locking in. In part two, we explore to what extent these effects operated 
in our three cases. In conclusion, we suggest the need for targets and PIs 
to build in procedures of scrutiny that help avoid the narrowing down 
and crowding out effects we observe. Our analysis draws on a range of 
policy documents: departmental annual reports and annual performance 
reviews; NAO reports on performance; and scrutiny of targets and PIs by 
relevant parliamentary committees.
TARGETS AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
UNDER NEW LABOUR, 2000‒2010
UK governments have been enamoured of targets and indicators since the 
early 1980s, when the Thatcher administration rolled out a series of per-
formance targets across sectors (Smith 1990). This approach was reinforced 
under the Labour administrations of 1997‒2010. In 1998, the government 
conducted a Comprehensive Spending Review, which introduced perform-
ance requirements across government. Each department was instructed to 
undertake a series of improvements to the way they delivered their services, 
in order to justify funding allocations. These targets were updated in 2000 
with a more comprehensive set of PSAs. The new PSAs set out for each 
major government department ‘its aim, objectives and the targets against 
which success will be measured’ (HM Treasury 2000). A key component 
was the measurement and monitoring of delivery of these targets, through 
annual departmental reports. Each objective was required to have at least 
one target which was ‘SMART’: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant 
and timed. PSAs were accompanied by Service Delivery Agreements 
(SDAs), concluded between the Treasury and each department, which set 
out more specific, lower- level targets and milestones to support delivery of 
the PSA targets.
While government rhetoric on targets and PIs focused on performance 
and delivery, implying that they were a tool for implementing policy, 
in many cases the selection of targets could be better characterized as 
an instrument of policy formulation. The selection of targets involved 
translating broad policy aims and objectives into specific and practically 
achievable goals. It therefore implied a process of identifying and assess-
ing different options for addressing policy problems – akin to Howlett’s 
definition of policy formulation (Howlett 2011, p. 30; see also Chapter 1, 
this volume). This raises important questions about the process for, and 
rationale behind, selecting targets. For example, what sorts of considera-
tion underpinned the selection of targets?
From the outset, it was clear that targets and PIs had a dual  function. 
Andrew J. Jordan and John R. Turnpenny - 9781783477036
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 04/20/2015 07:51:43AM
via free access
228 The tools of policy formulation
The Treasury characterized the PSAs as ‘a major agenda to deliver 
and demonstrate change in the commissioning, management and deliv-
ery of public services’ (HM Treasury 2002a, p. 13; emphasis added). 
‘Departments were given a real incentive to drive up standards in public 
services and the public was given the opportunity to judge their perform-
ance’ (ibid, p. 12).
This dual purpose of steering performance while also demonstrating 
improvement conforms to insights which suggest that targets and indicators 
function as ‘boundary objects’ (Turnhout 2009, p. 405; see also Chapters 4 
and 12, this volume). On the one hand, targets and PIs are adopted to 
enhance public sector performance, through what might be termed their 
‘disciplining’ function: they provide incentives for actors involved in formu-
lating and implementing policy to improve their performance and ensure 
‘value for money’. But at the same time, targets and PIs clearly have a range 
of other, more political, functions. They may be developed for symbolic 
reasons, to signal commitment to, and underscore achievement of, a range 
of political or organizational goals. Targets and PIs thus need to operate as 
management tools, providing relevant and practical guidance for steering 
policy; but at the same time, they need to resonate with – and often mitigate 
– public concerns about public service performance; and in some cases, they 
also need to signal to other audiences such as lobby groups, foreign govern-
ments or international organizations that the government is committed to a 
particular course of action (Boswell 2014).
Aside from this dual function of delivering and demonstrating improved 
public services, there were a number of formal and technical criteria that 
guided the selection of targets. First, targets needed to be monitored, and 
thus linked to indicators. The potential to measure and monitor targets 
through PIs was built into the very definition of targets. Second, targets 
increasingly became focused on outcomes. The House of Commons 
Treasury Select Committee, which monitors Treasury policy, calculated 
in 2000 that most of the targets under the 1998 PSA had been ‘process’ 
(51 per cent) or ‘output’ (27 per cent), with only 11 per cent comprising 
outcome targets (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 2000). It 
recommended that the new PSAs established in 2000 focus more on out-
comes; and indeed the National Audit Office classified 68 per cent of the 
targets adopted in 2000 as outcome targets (NAO 2001, p. 1).
In short, the selection of targets and PIs was guided by three sets of 
considerations: the managerial goal of disciplining behaviour to improve 
performance; the political goal of signalling to key audiences that key 
objectives were being met; and formal requirements linked to measure-
ment, with a focus on outcomes.
What sorts of constraining effects did PSAs have on policy formulation? 
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For a start, we can expect that the various managerial, political and tech-
nical requirements for selecting targets might have the effect of narrowing 
down the range of policy objectives that were to be considered. It was 
certainly a tall order for targets to meet all of the formal and substantive 
criteria set out. PSAs are therefore likely to have fostered a reliance on a 
narrow set of indicators as proxies for meeting a set of broader organiza-
tional and policy objectives. They represent what Bevan and Hood (2006, 
p. 521) have identified as a form of synecdoche: treating a part to stand for 
the whole.
Second, and related to this, we might expect targets and PIs to have a 
crowding out effect, re- orienting both political debate and organizational 
action to focus on performance against the selected targets. There is 
limited scope in this chapter for examining how far PSAs influenced politi-
cal debate on policy objectives. However, we can identify processes of 
crowding out by examining the type of scrutiny exercised by peer organi-
zations. Notably, the NAO and parliamentary select committees had a 
formal role in monitoring performance, and assessing the effectiveness of 
PSAs across policy sectors. Thus one important indicator of crowding out 
is to explore how far these bodies bought into, or challenged, the selection 
and scope of targets and PIs.
Third, PSAs might be predicted to have a locking- in effect, tying gov-
ernment departments to a particular course of action, even in the event 
of a change in circumstances or policy priorities. Indeed, from early on, 
targets and PIs were criticized for being overly rigid and centralized, and 
allowing insufficient flexibility for local government and other actors 
involved in service delivery (NAO 2001; House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee 2003). The 2004 PSAs responded to 
these criticisms by claiming to reduce the number of targets, allowing 
more flexibility. Many targets also became more ‘directional’, with per-
formance measured in terms of improvement or deterioration, rather than 
meeting a specific numerical target. Yet clearly the scope for such adjust-
ments was constrained by the setting of earlier commitments and the fact 
that such commitments were transparent and had a built- in system of 
monitoring and scrutiny.
In order to investigate these constraining effects, we examine three 
areas: immigration control, climate change and defence procurement. 
One of our expectations is that these dynamics will vary depending on 
the audience being targeted by policymakers. Are policymakers involved 
in the selection of targets trying to meet the expectations of public opinion/
the media, parliamentary or other organizations involved in oversight, or 
the specialized policy community (practitioners, NGOs, researchers)? We 
expect this to have an influence on which targets and indicators they select; 
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and, as a result, how pronounced the three effects on policy formulation 
are. For each case, we therefore start by examining the rationale for the 
selection of targets. We then explore how far this selection was associated 
with a crowding out effect. And finally, we analyse how far policymak-
ers became locked in to a given course of action in the face of changed 
circumstances.
CASES OF POLICY FORMULATION
Immigration Control
Immigration control covers a range of measures to control the entry, resi-
dence and employment of immigrants and refugees. It has long been part 
of the remit of the Home Office, and more specifically its Border Agency. 
The UK Border Agency (UKBA – originally named the Border and 
Immigration Agency) was set up in 2007, as successor to the Immigration 
and Nationality Directorate.
A striking feature of the targets adopted on immigration control in the 
2000s was the gap between very broad strategic objectives, and the very 
narrow scope of the targets adopted. The 2000 PSA and the 2002 Service 
Delivery Agreement both set out a broad objective for the Home Office in 
this area, covering the areas of meeting economic and skills requirements 
through work permits/entry policies, facilitating international travel, more 
efficient asylum systems, and – in the case of the 2002 SDA –  effective 
programmes for dealing with citizenship and long- term immigration 
applications. Yet the targets set under this objective all related to asylum 
applications, removals and detention. Thus the 2000 targets were (1) to 
ensure that by 2004, 75 per cent of asylum applications are decided within 
two months, and (2) to remove a greater proportion of failed asylum 
seekers. The 2002 SDA further refined these two targets, and added a 
third target of increasing detention capacity. So despite a very broad set 
of objectives, the targets adopted focused on one very narrow area. What 
explains this disparity?
One possible explanation is technical: many areas of performance 
relevant to the broader objectives would be difficult to measure. There 
is a high degree of uncertainty in measuring, for example, the successful 
integration of refugees, or the social and economic impact of immigra-
tion, or the scale of irregular migration. By contrast, asylum statistics 
are regular, reliable and based on a well- established registration system 
(Boswell 2012). Yet the same would apply to other aspects of the target – 
such as work permits, or citizenship applications and acquisition. It would 
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also have been quite feasible to measure performance on, for example, the 
quality of first decisions on asylum applications. So while technical criteria 
may have partly explained the focus on asylum, it certainly was not the 
only aspect of policy meeting these conditions.
A far more plausible explanation is the political saliency of asylum 
at that time. Asylum applications had been rising in recent years, and 
there was intense mass media coverage of the issue. So while asylum is 
just one aspect of immigration policy – and arguably not as critical for 
socio- economic welfare as others, such as the impact of immigration on 
Britain’s economy or society – it was the most politicized, and the one on 
which the government was receiving most criticism from the media. In 
the case of the Home Office’s immigration targets, then, the criterion of 
selection seems to have been very much geared to meeting political objec-
tives, notably addressing public concerns as articulated in mass media 
reporting.
The importance of public opinion becomes even clearer if we consider 
the audiences that were not being addressed through this selection of 
targets. It was certainly not responding to concerns about administrative 
inefficiency within the Home Office, which had been articulated in par-
liamentary debate and mass media reporting. Nor was there a concern to 
address the business/employers audience, who would be more concerned 
about ensuring an efficient and swift process for processing permits, and 
a flexible approach to policy on entry. The focus on removals and deten-
tion, as well as the emphasis on speeding up asylum decision making 
(rather than improving its quality) was also likely to be the object of criti-
cism by NGOs and human rights groups. Indeed, given that the Labour 
government’s immigration policy was in many ways emerging as quite 
liberal and progressive – at least in the area of labour migration – it is 
striking that they should have adopted a set of targets exclusively empha-
sizing the restrictive and potentially human- rights- violating aspects of 
Home Office policy. It represents a very pronounced case of narrowing 
down.
The highly politicized nature of the asylum- related targets was illus-
trated by Prime Minister Tony Blair’s appearance on the BBC’s flagship 
television current affairs programme, Newsnight, in early 2003. Blair unex-
pectedly pledged to halve asylum seeker numbers within a year, although 
this had not been part of either the 2000 or 2002 targets, and was not the 
object of prior consultation with the Home Office (Boswell 2009, p. 140). 
A target reflecting this new pledge was introduced in the Home Office 
Departmental Report, 2004‒2005, and thereafter the goal of reducing the 
number of new asylum applications became one of the targets (incorpo-
rated into the PSAs covering 2004 and 2007).
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If targets had a narrowing down effect, how far did they crowd out a 
focus on other policy objectives? The focus on asylum targets, and  especially 
Blair’s high profile announcement on Newsnight, was the object of wide 
media coverage. The target also became one of the top priorities for the 
Prime Minister’s influential Delivery Unit, implying intense scrutiny and 
pressure from No. 10. This crowding out effect was reinforced by the system 
for monitoring performance. In principle, one might expect the bodies 
responsible for scrutinizing PSAs to have questioned the selection of targets 
as being overly narrow. Yet the bodies most closely involved in monitoring 
Home Office PSAs – the National Audit Office, and the House of Commons 
Home Affairs and Public Administration Select Committees – largely 
bought into the selection of targets. NAO reports on Home Office targets 
and PIs over this period focused almost exclusively on technical aspects of 
the PSAs. The Home Affairs Committee did raise some issues around the 
selection and potential effects of targets. Yet their focus was on problems of 
feasibility, whether they were sufficiently ambitious and whether there were 
too many targets. Rather than challenging the narrowing down and crowd-
ing out effects, these bodies arguably contributed to them by urging a focus 
on even narrower and more ambitious ‘stretch’ targets.
Finally, how far did these targets have a lock- in effect, restricting the 
flexibility of the Home Office in responding to changing circumstances? 
Here the evidence suggests that the lock- in effect was relatively limited. 
The Home Office was able to shift its targets and objectives several times, 
in response either to challenges in meeting the targets, or changed political 
objectives. For example, the target on removals saw a number of shifts 
over the decade. The first shift was towards a more precise target. While 
the 2000 PSA simply talked of ‘removing a greater proportion of failed 
asylum seekers’, the 2002 SDA aimed to increase the number of removals 
to 30,000 by March 2003. The Home Office was subsequently forced to 
admit this target was too ambitious. In a scathing critique, the House of 
Commons Home Affairs Select Committee (2003, p. 23) noted that:
We are at a loss to understand the basis for the belief that a target of 30,000 
removals a year was achievable, and ministerial pronouncements on the subject 
are obscure. It is surely not too much to expect that, if it is thought necessary to 
set targets for removals, they should be rational and achievable.
In the new 2004 PSA, this target was adjusted from a specific numerical 
target back to a ‘directional’ target, that is, to remove a greater propor-
tion of failed asylum seekers in 2005‒2006 compared with 2002‒2003. 
This represents a clear case of ‘gaming’ through an attempt to manage the 
presentation of performance (James 2004, p. 409). Even this more modest 
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target was not achieved. Despite criticism by the Home Affairs Select 
Committee, the Home Office retained its directional target.
The Home Office was also able to adjust its substantive targets over 
the decade. By the time of the 2007 PSA, the Home Office’s objective for 
immigration had become more narrowly focused on control: ‘Securing our 
borders, preventing abuse of our immigration laws and managing migra-
tion to boost the UK’ (Home Office 2007, p. 54). With declining numbers 
of asylum applicants, the focus was also shifting to border control. In 
line with the government’s approach of reducing the number of targets, 
the Home Office claimed to have just one target: reduce the time taken to 
process asylum applications.
To summarize, the setting of targets in the area of immigration policy 
appears to have been strongly driven by political considerations, notably 
the perceived need to signal to the public that the government was acting 
to reduce asylum applications and detain or deport those who were not 
considered to be genuine refugees. This led to a significant narrowing 
down of policy priorities, and a focus on scrutinizing performance against 
those targets. However, the Home Office found ways to avoid being 
locked in to these targets when they appeared either unfeasible, or no 
longer relevant to its core strategic objectives.
Climate Change
Before 2001, environmental commitments including climate change were 
dealt with by a large, portmanteau Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (DETR). From June 2001, the DETR was 
reorganized with the principal environmental responsibilities shifting to 
DEFRA (the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 
resulting in the objectives and targets for climate change being located 
in a more conventionally environmental framework. Then, as a conse-
quence of the new climate policy architecture defined by the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, in October of that year a new Ministry was established – the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). While DEFRA 
retained some responsibilities for climate change, these were essentially 
restricted to adaptation to impacts – it was clear that climate change was 
now being framed as an energy (and thus industrial) issue as much as an 
environmental one (see Yearley 2002, p. 277‒279). Thus, within a decade the 
political and organizational location – and, to some degree, the framing – 
of the climate issue moved around a good deal and this in itself  impacted 
the context for relevant PSAs.
Policies for and action around climate change have featured as objec-
tives in all three sets of PSAs and the government’s plans and obligations 
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in this area have consistently occupied a prominent position among the 
PSAs, being typically included high up in the list of environmental topics.
Though the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review made no mention of 
climate change nor the greenhouse effect in its targets for DETR – the only 
possible link was to the overall aim of promoting sustainable development 
(HM Treasury 1998, p. 13) – by the time DEFRA’s PSAs were spelled out 
in 2002, performance target 2 was to ‘[i]mprove the environment and the 
sustainable use of natural resources, including through the use of energy 
saving technologies, to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% 
from 1990 levels and moving towards a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2010’ (HM Treasury 2002b, p. 27). The specific target here 
was precisely that adopted in the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (agreed in outline in 1997), to 
which the UK and the EU were signatories.
The Kyoto Protocol stipulated that signatory countries had to reduce 
emissions of six greenhouse gasses by set amounts. The UK commitment 
was to achieve a 12.5 per cent reduction by 2008‒2012. As is clear in the 
quote above, in the 2002 PSA, this goal was supplemented by the more 
vaguely expressed idea of ‘moving towards’ a bigger reduction in CO2 
alone, though it was unclear whether the idea was to achieve this larger cut 
by 2010 or merely to be moving towards it by that date. The Treasury’s 
document (2002b, p. 28) noted that the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry was jointly responsible for delivering these goals, though no 
mechanism was identified for ensuring joint action (see the subsequent 
probing comments in the Fourth Report of the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2005, section 5, 
para 35]). In its Autumn Performance Report 2002, DEFRA (2002, p. 33) 
gave more detail in separate chapters on the Spending Review 2000, the 
1998 Comprehensive Spending Review, and the Spending Review 2002: 
PSA and the Future, noting in each case a commitment to meeting the 
Kyoto targets and noting explicitly that DEFRA took on the environ-
mental PSAs that formerly related to DETR. It also looked forward to 
the PSA for 2003‒2006, for which it expressed the greenhouse gas target in 
exactly the same manner.
When DEFRA published its 2004 PSAs for the Comprehensive 
Spending Review, the same target 2 was in place, this time with the inter-
national treaty dimension made even clearer:
To reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 12.5% below 1990 levels in line with our 
Kyoto commitment and move towards a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emis-
sions below 1990 levels by 2010, through measures including energy efficiency 
and renewables. Joint with the Department of Trade and Industry and the 
Department for Transport. (HM Treasury 2004a, p. 33)
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This target was still in place at the time of the Autumn Performance 
Report 2006 (see p. 22ff) though in this document much greater detail was 
given about trends in performance of emissions and about new initiatives 
such as the Office of Climate Change (OCC) which was created ‘to work 
across Government to provide a shared resource for analysis and develop-
ment of climate change policy and strategy’ (DEFRA 2006, p. 25). Details 
of how emissions are gauged were also available in the Technical Note to 
the PSAs (HM Treasury 2004b). In a summary table (DEFRA 2006, p. 73) 
listing ‘progress against 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement 
targets’, the climate action was said to be ‘on course’.
The alignment of targets with international treaty obligations is in 
marked contrast to the immigration control case, where the selection of 
targets was dominated by more populist domestic political considerations. 
It suggests a quite different rationale for PSAs on climate change: that of 
seeking to meet international obligations through disciplining the behav-
iour of organizations and actors involved in delivering emissions reduc-
tions. The choice of such a transparent and public tool for setting out this 
target is also likely to have had a symbolic function, designed to signal to 
the specialized climate change community that the government was fully 
committed to meeting its obligations – a signal backed up in the detail of 
the Technical Note.
However, as with the immigration case, the focus on a very restricted 
range of targets is interesting in itself. In this policy area the focus on 
reductions in aggregate greenhouse gas emissions and in total releases of 
CO2, at least for the first two rounds of PSAs, did serve to narrow down 
the question of what climate policies are fundamentally about. The focus 
fell exclusively on emissions ascribed to the UK according to the conven-
tions of Kyoto and thus, for example, reporting did not address emissions 
from the (then fast- growing) airline business. Equally, though it is clear 
that the British Government was keen to have a ‘stretch’ target for CO2 
beyond mere compliance with Kyoto, there was also a narrowing down 
in that the PSA targets highlighted emissions reductions, as opposed 
to adaptation to impacts for example. The concentration on the Kyoto 
targets narrowed down the scope for questioning whether those targets 
were adequate or rapid enough and, like the whole Kyoto process, tended 
to emphasize territorial emissions made directly from the UK rather than 
consumption- based ones embedded in products imported to the UK.
Such narrowing down was also accompanied by crowding out. As 
mentioned above, the rapid rise in emissions from innovative (often 
low- cost) airlines was not factored in. Also crowded out was the ques-
tion of whether emissions reductions are being achieved simply through 
de- industrialization or switching to less polluting energy sources such as 
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gas. On this latter point, it is noteworthy that the goods and services that 
British people consume could continue to have a rising ‘carbon footprint’ 
even while the UK’s officially attributable emissions fell. There is at least 
one further crowding out effect which is that attention – even within the 
broad environmental gaze of DEFRA – was focused on emissions and 
much less on adapting to the unfolding impacts of climate change.
There is less evidence of a strong locking- in effect. If the 2002 and 
2004 targets closely matched Kyoto commitments, the 2007 commitment 
adopted more ambitious goals, as adumbrated by the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution (HM Treasury 2004b, para 2.6). The new 
PSA Delivery Agreement 27 of October 2007 proclaimed in its title the 
objective of leading the ‘global effort to avoid dangerous climate change’ 
(HM Treasury 2007). This was to be assessed through six ‘key indicators’ 
ranging from the UK’s own emissions to international emissions trends, a 
proxy measure used to assess climate impacts (access to sustainable water 
abstraction) and an assessment of the size of the world carbon market 
(HM Treasury 2007, p. 5‒6). This document also referred to the draft 
Climate Change Bill and its aim of setting CO2 emissions for 2050 at least 
60 per cent lower than the reference year, 1990.
This PSA was distinctive in several ways. For one thing, it introduced 
dramatically more demanding emissions- reductions targets for the UK. 
Second, it introduced a specific discussion of the issue of adaptation to 
climate change. It promised to set out an integrated adaptation frame-
work, dealing with issues such as flooding arising from changing rainfall 
patterns, and potential impacts on biodiversity and agriculture. Finally, it 
had a focus on the UK’s role not just in combating climate- changing emis-
sions at home but in ‘leading’ the global effort and, in particular, ‘demon-
strating to other parties the practical, economic, environmental and social 
benefits that tackling climate change in a cost- effective way can deliver’ 
(HM Treasury 2007, p. 3). Recognizing that climate problems cannot be 
addressed by any one country in isolation – and indeed that a country that 
is a lone pioneer could incur costs and accrue few benefits – the objectives 
shifted. The UK set itself a very demanding headline target but also put an 
emphasis on promoting international action; at the same time it has a clear 
notion of the shape that the international action should take: it should be 
a solution based on carbon markets.
This more ambitious goal reflected a changing political context in which 
no successor to the Kyoto agreement was in sight and where China and 
other fast- developing economies were highly significant CO2 emitters but 
not required to take any action under the Kyoto Protocol. The govern-
ment’s domestic achievements could be seen to have been in vain if no 
steps were taken to address these aspects of climate change. In this sense, 
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the signalling function was important. In its 2009 report, the National 
Audit Office picked up on this sensitivity, noting that:
Under the HM Treasury performance rating system, the Department could 
have assessed its performance as ‘strong progress’ because more than half of 
the indicators were demonstrating improvement or meeting the success require-
ment. However, given that forecasts of global CO2 emissions in 2050 have con-
tinued to rise, the Department considers that it has made only ‘some progress’ 
in 2008‒09. (NAO 2009, p. 21)
In its Annual Report (DECC, Annual Report and Resource Accounts 
2008‒2009, p. 51, cited in NAO 2009), DECC scored itself lower than it 
could have in order to signal that the key ambition of helping to contain 
global emissions had not been attained. It was apparently keen to forestall 
criticism through humble demeanour.
Defence Procurement
Defence procurement covers the commissioning and purchase of equip-
ment for the British armed forces, and falls under the remit of the Ministry 
of Defence (MoD). A series of organizational changes and initiatives took 
place over the post- 1997 period, including the establishment of the Defence 
Procurement Agency (DPA) and the Defence Logistics Organisation 
(DLO) in April 1999, a new Smart Procurement Agency in 2000, and even-
tually reorganization of the DPA and DLO into Defence Equipment & 
Support (DE&S) in 2007. As with DECC in the last section, these changes 
shaped the evolution of the MoD’s PSA targets over the period 2000–2010.
The overall objective stated for equipment in the first Ministry of 
Defence PSA was ‘to procure equipment which most cost- effectively 
meets agreed military requirements’ (HM Treasury 1998, p. 69). The focus 
was on two key defence procurement concerns: cost and schedule over-
runs. There were three specific performance targets for procurement: ‘on 
average, no in- year increase in major project costs’; ‘on average, in- year 
slippage of In- Service Date of new major projects of less than 10 days’; 
and ‘on average, in- year slippage of In- Service Date of existing major 
projects of less than 4 weeks’ (HM Treasury 1998, p. 72). The targets for 
2003‒2006 included a further PI: ‘97% of customers’ key requirements 
attained and maintained through the PSA period’ (MoD 2004, p. 12), but 
did not detail how this was to be measured (MoD 2002, p. 58).
The focus on issues of cost and overrun is not surprising given long- 
standing concerns about efficiency and value- for- money in defence pro-
curement practices. Defence procurement in the UK, as elsewhere, has 
long suffered from difficulties with delivering suitable equipment on 
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time and on budget (Gansler 1980; Page 2006). In 2009 an authoritative 
independent report carried out for the Ministry of Defence noted that on 
average equipment programmes ‘cost 40% more than they were originally 
expected to, and are delivered 80% later than first estimates predicted’ 
(Gray 2009, p. 16). A series of critical reports and attempts at reform over 
many decades has done little to improve what is an intractable problem.
By their nature, state- of- the- art weapons systems are likely to be 
expensive and take longer than planned. In this sense, the development of 
targets and PIs focused on these procedural aspects of procurement may 
not in themselves have narrowed down the MoD’s focus: rather, they were 
an accurate reflection of organizational priorities over this period. Yet the 
preoccupation with procedural aspects of procurement, as codified in the 
targets, had the effect of decoupling narrow performance goals from con-
siderations about the effectiveness of equipment. In this sense, the targets 
appear to have reinforced a crowding out tendency within the MoD. This 
can be illustrated most clearly by the gap between MoD claims about 
meeting PSA targets on the one hand, and real- world military perform-
ance on the other.
Between 1998 and 2010, the MoD consistently claimed to be meeting the 
targets and PIs set out in the PSAs. The MoD’s 1998‒1999 Performance 
Report, for example, claimed that ‘cost and technical performance targets 
were met’ (though the latter was not a target specified in the PSA), 
and provided combined data for project slippage dates for both new 
and existing projects which exceeded the target of four weeks by about 
50  per  cent (MoD 1999, para 38). The following year, the MoD’s 
1999‒2000 Performance Report (MoD 2000, p. 11) matched perform-
ance data more explicitly to the targets, with the cost target reported as 
achieved, the in- service slippage of existing projects reported as achieved 
for a revised interim target and date, and the in- service slippage of existing 
projects not achieved, again for an interim target. This report also claimed 
that there were no projects with ‘unsatisfactory technical performance’ 
(MoD 2000, p. 34) (though technical performance was still not a PSA 
target at the time). The cost target was again met the following year, but 
slippage of in- service dates exceeded the targets, with the verdict that per-
formance was ‘on course’ rather than ‘met’ (MoD 2001, p. 10). Subsequent 
years showed similar performance, with cost again met in 2001‒2002, but 
schedule targets not met. Over the rest of the decade some targets would 
be met and some not, typically with apparently small slippages in schedule 
more common than cost overruns.
From 2002 onwards, however, it was becoming increasingly  apparent 
that these PSA reports’ messages that ‘key requirements’ were being 
attained contrasted strongly with real- world military performance. With 
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British forces involved in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2002, deficiencies 
in defence procurement processes were becoming increasingly apparent. 
Providing combat troops with suitable equipment in a timely fashion 
‘relied on a separate stream of fast- tracked acquisition to meet “urgent 
operational requirements” (UORs)’ (Gray 2009, p. 22). As the House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee noted (2009, p. 18) ‘the extent of 
UORs represents at least a partial failure by the MoD to equip adequately 
its forces for expeditionary operations’.
This gap between PSA targets and operational performance was largely 
overlooked by bodies scrutinizing MoD performance, such as the Select 
Committee and the NAO, which retained a focus on problems of over- 
spend and over- run. Neither body fundamentally questioned whether the 
procurement PSAs were fulfilling their supposed purpose. Taking one 
example, in its report, ‘Defence Procurement 2006’ (House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee 2006, para 17), the Select Committee cautioned 
that ‘while cost growth on defence equipment projects in 2005‒2006 was 
below target, we have concerns that the main reason for this was reduction 
in the quantity of equipment ordered’. Despite highlighting its concern 
that ‘[m]eeting key targets should not be given priority over meeting the 
requirements of our Armed Forces’ (ibid, para 17), there is no discussion 
of whether targets are appropriate or relate to the wider strategic objec-
tives of the department. Indeed, suggestive of a crowding out effect, the 
same report underscores its desire that the MoD ‘continue to monitor 
its performance at procuring equipment to time, cost and quality . . . 
Otherwise, there is a risk that poor procurement performance could be 
buried in long- term project management data’ (House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee 2006, para 26).
The overall judgement of UK defence procurement at the end of the 
2000s can be seen in the critical report by Gray (2009, p. 28), which 
notes that every year the procurement agency would begin ‘with plans to 
conduct activity some 10 per cent greater than the available, and known, 
budget for that year’, and this shortfall could only be resolved by ‘re- 
profiling’ – in effect delaying programmes to delay their costs, but at the 
expense of schedule slippage, greater eventual costs, and ‘projects more 
likely to experience problems’. For example, in 2008 the National Audit 
Office criticized the MoD for ‘failing to forecast aggregate costs’, result-
ing in an ‘additional 96 month slippage rate’ despite the exclusion of the 
Typhoon aircraft project on the grounds that it was ‘commercially sensi-
tive’ (NAO 2008, summary paragraph 1). One target (cost) is prioritized 
because it is the most pressing as regards MoD budgets, but both schedule 
and performance thus suffer. Arguably, this crowding out was already 
endemic within the MoD, a response to long- standing pressures on the 
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organization to focus on narrow procedural aspects of performance. But 
the codification of these goals within PSAs, and the reporting and scrutiny 
processes put in place as part of the PSAs, undoubtedly reinforced this 
tendency. The targets and PIs developed failed to provide an adequate 
measure of operational performance, with the result that this most impor-
tant feature of performance was under- emphasized.
As with the two other cases, the defence procurement PSA is unlikely to 
have had a strong locking- in effect, except in the superficial sense of cre-
ating a reporting requirement. The MoD’s annual Performance Reports 
during the decade bear witness to a tendency to pay lip service to targets, 
while the minor failures to meet some targets in some years led to a cumu-
lative ‘black hole’ in the procurement budget. The consequences of trying 
to squeeze too much procurement into a constrained annual budget meant 
that UK defence procurement was certainly locked in to a vicious cycle, 
but the PSA targets were not the cause of this.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the ways in which targets and PIs can influence 
policy formulation, focusing on three types of constraining effect: narrow-
ing down the range of policy options considered; crowding out attention 
to broader policy objectives; and locking policymakers into a particular 
course of action regardless of changing conditions. We also examined how 
far these effects varied across policy areas characterized by rather differ-
ent sets of pressures: immigration control; climate change; and defence 
procurement.
Our analysis suggested that variations in the organizations’ audiences 
did indeed influence how targets and PIs were selected and deployed. In 
the case of the Home Office, the selection of targets appeared to be geared 
towards mollifying public opinion and the media, through focusing on a 
very limited set of goals associated with populist approaches to immigra-
tion. The focus on reducing asylum applications and increasing removals 
suggested that targets had a strong signalling function, implying a sym-
bolic, rather than disciplining, function. In the case of climate change, 
DECC and its predecessors’ choice of targets was oriented towards 
meeting international treaty obligations, again leading to a significant nar-
rowing down of broader objectives to a very specific goal of reducing emis-
sions. The selection of targets and PIs can be interpreted as having a dual 
function of disciplining those actors responsible for delivering emission 
reductions and signalling commitment to Kyoto. The subsequent shift to 
more ambitious targets was also designed to signal UK leadership in the 
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international process of reducing greenhouse  gas emissions. In the case of 
defence procurement, the MoD’s selection of targets was again very nar-
rowly focused, this time on addressing problems of poor management and 
financial oversight. The focus on these aspects of organizational practice 
suggests that the choice of indicators was a response to pressure exerted by 
organizations such as the Treasury, the NAO and the Commons Defence 
Committee.
In all three cases, then, we saw a significant narrowing down of policy 
objectives, though for different reasons. And in all three cases, the implica-
tion was that targets and PIs covered only a small part of the broader stra-
tegic objectives identified by the respective department. We also showed 
that in each of the three cases, the structures put in place to monitor 
targets and PIs appeared to reinforce this narrowing  down effect. In the 
terminology developed in this paper, they contributed to a crowding out of 
other types of objectives. In the case of immigration control, the NAO and 
Parliamentary Committee scrutiny of targets and PIs focused dispropor-
tionately on technical questions, as well as demands for more ambitious 
and specific targets. Questions of whether the targets were the right ones 
to select, whether they adequately balanced different priorities, or whether 
they did justice to the broader strategic objectives of the Home Office, 
were not raised. Similarly, in the case of targets on climate change, the 
narrowing down of goals to focus on emissions reduction was not a major 
object of scrutiny, with oversight instead focusing on more technical ques-
tions of distance to target. In the case of defence procurement, the focus 
of targets and PIs on narrow managerial criteria implied that these tools 
became decoupled from broader objectives related to the performance of 
equipment in contemporary conflict situations. Paradoxically, then, a set 
of tools designed to shift the political focus onto outcomes was deployed 
in a way that resulted in a preoccupation with process.
Our cases showed less evidence of lock- in effects. To be sure, problems 
of lock- in to inflexible, centralized objectives were an object of general 
concern in discussion of PSAs from the early 1990s onwards. But the 
fact that the organizations we examined could and frequently did adjust, 
reinterpret, evade, demote or abandon targets implied a high degree of 
flexibility in implementing targets and PIs. The three organizations all 
found ways of circumventing the limitations imposed by targets. In the 
case of immigration control, targets were watered down when they proved 
unfeasible (removals) or demoted when they were no longer a political 
priority (asylum numbers). In the case of climate change, by contrast, 
targets were made more ambitious (emissions reduction). And in the case 
of defence procurement, targets were added to (customer satisfaction) but 
also repeatedly unmet. So in line with the literature, our analysis suggests 
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that the disciplining function of targets may be less effective than their 
authors might claim (Bevan and Hood 2006; Smith 1990).
Our analysis has important implications for the design of systems to 
monitor targets and PIs. The NAO and House of Commons committees 
tended to focus on technical features of these tools. This is not surprising 
in the case of the NAO, whose very existence is premised on the ethical 
and managerial virtues of accountability and audit. These bodies are 
committed to the idea that good practice in targets and PIs necessarily 
increases transparency, accountability and performance. It is perhaps 
less obvious that parliamentary scrutiny would focus on a rather narrow 
set of criticisms. Once in place, targets and PIs may well provide a useful 
short- cut for assessing performance in some areas, relieving overloaded 
committees of the task of defining which aspects of organizational 
 performance to scrutinize, or on what basis to do so. This may create a 
temptation either to judge departments based on the targets and PIs they 
have created, or – where the targets and PIs themselves are criticized – to 
question them on the basis of whether they are sufficiently ambitious, 
precise, and so on. There appears to be very limited or no provision for 
pointing out flaws related to narrowing down and crowding out effects. 
Once these bodies have bought into the notion of accountability and 
performance monitoring – principles which are difficult to reject per se – 
then it may become difficult to find a basis for a broader critique of the 
targets selected.
Yet given the influence of such targets and PIs on policy formula-
tion, and the potential for narrowing down and crowding out effects, we 
suggest it would be useful to find a mid- level critique: one that does not 
reject the value of monitoring per se; but one which at the same time does 
not focus too narrowly on technicalities. Such scrutiny should involve 
deliberation on how far the selection and implementation of targets and 
PIs does justice to broader policy objectives. In effect, then, this implies a 
process of deliberation that recognizes and constantly scrutinizes the link 
between monitoring and policy formulation.
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